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Security: Orang-Studio/OrangMove

SECURITY.md

OrangMove - Safety Analysis

the OrangMove upload/serve service (Rust backend + React SPA) and its intended deployment behind nginx + Anubis + Cloudflare on oranges.lt.

Threat model

Anonymous internet users can upload and download files. There is no login. We assume an attacker will try to: run code on the server, read other people's files or files outside the store, fill the disk, get a malicious file to execute in a victim's browser under our origin, or abuse us as free bulk storage.

Controls in place

Risk Control Where
Guessing other people's links 256-bit CSPRNG token, base64url (43 chars). No enumeration. token.rs
Path traversal (../, absolute, null) Tokens validated against a strict charset before any FS call; disk path is dir/<token> with no user-supplied component. token.rs, store.rs:path_for
Code execution on server Files are never executed, decompressed, or passed to a shell. Inert bytes. by design
Executables and scripts Accepted. Never executed, decompressed or shelled out to; served as a forced attachment under nosniff, and the preview has no renderable type for them. The risk is to whoever runs the file, not to this server. routes.rs, by design
Oversized upload / single-file DoS 1 GiB cap counted live during streaming; Content-Length is not trusted; partial file deleted on abort. routes.rs, lib.rs (DefaultBodyLimit)
Disk exhaustion over time Global live-storage cap (ORANG_MAX_TOTAL, default 20 GiB) → 507 when full. store.rs:live_total, routes.rs
Request flooding Per-IP rate limit (burst 60, refill 1/s) keyed on X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP. main.rs, lib.rs:rate_limited
Stored XSS via "view in browser" Served as application/octet-stream + nosniff + Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox, and embedded in an iframe with sandbox="" (no scripts, no same-origin). routes.rs:view, ResultPage.tsx
Drive-by download tricks Download endpoint forces Content-Disposition: attachment + nosniff. routes.rs:download
Header injection via filename Filename stripped of path, control chars, quotes, backslashes; length-capped. store.rs:sanitize_name
SQL injection All queries parameterized (sqlx bind). store.rs
Stale files lingering Reaper deletes expired files + rows every 5 s; access after expiry → 404. main.rs, store.rs:reap

Residual risks & required deployment hardening

These are real and must be handled in deployment, not code:

  1. Rate-limit IP spoofing. The limiter trusts X-Forwarded-For. If the backend is reachable directly, a client can forge that header and bypass the limit. Mitigation: bind the backend to 127.0.0.1:8080 only (the systemd unit does this) so the only path in is nginx, which overwrites X-Real-IP with the true peer.

  2. Cloudflare 100 MB body cap. Cloudflare's proxy (orange cloud, and CF Tunnel) rejects request bodies over 100 MB on Free/Pro. The upload/file subdomain must therefore be DNS-only (grey cloud) pointing at the server, not proxied and not behind a tunnel. Otherwise the 1 GiB limit silently becomes ~100 MB.

  3. Anubis must not front the file API. Anubis issues a proof-of-work challenge; that breaks programmatic downloads and large uploads. Anubis fronts the app subdomain (static SPA) only. The files subdomain goes straight to the backend.

  4. Origin isolation. Untrusted file bytes are served from a separate subdomain (files.*) than the app (move.*). Even though view is already neutralised, this keeps any future slip from touching the app origin or its cookies. CORS is locked to the app origin via APP_ORIGIN.

  5. TLS. Terminated at nginx (Let's Encrypt). Backend speaks plain HTTP on loopback only.

  6. No malware/AV scanning, and no file-type blocklist. Any type may be uploaded, executables included. Files are short-lived (≤1 h) and never executed here, so the server is safe; recipients are responsible for what they open. Document this in the ToS.

  7. Abuse / illegal content. No moderation. Short TTLs limit exposure; keep nginx access logs and have a takedown path. Consider lowering ORANG_MAX_TOTAL and the max TTL if abuse appears.

Verified by tests

cargo test: live size-cap abort, lying Content-Length, executables accepted and served inert, scripts accepted, bad TTL, malformed/traversal token, expired-token 404, view sandbox headers, happy-path byte round-trip, byte ranges, storage cap → 507, rate limit → 429.

There aren't any published security advisories