[AUTO-CHERRYPICK] [AutoPR- Security] Patch strongswan for CVE-2026-78135, CVE-2026-78134, CVE-2026-78132, CVE-2026-78131, CVE-2026-78130, CVE-2026-78129, CVE-2026-78127, CVE-2026-78126, CVE-2026-78124, CVE-2026-78123 [HIGH] - branch 3.0-dev

SPECS/strongswan/CVE-2026-78123.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From b3d479d00ab4617128b9a654b880c012c214aaf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
+Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 17:51:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] openssl: Fix undefined memory access when verifying PKCS#7
+ containers
+
+If the signerInfo or recipientInfo structure doesn't contain
+issuerAndSerialNumber but instead a subjectKeyIdentifier, then the called
+functions will leave the passed name and serial numbers unchanged.  While
+openssl_x509_name2id() prevents a NULL-pointer dereference, it tries to
+DER-encode the object at the passed pointer via i2d_X509_NAME().
+Depending on the stack contents, this likely causes a segmentation fault.
+
+Fixes: 3c820cdc232a ("Implement PKCS#7 decryption using openssl")
+Fixes: c61723c69fb5 ("Implement OpenSSL PKCS#7 signed-data parsing and verification")
+Fixes: CVE-2026-78123
+Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account <azurelinux-security@microsoft.com>
+Upstream-reference: https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2026-78123/strongswan-5.0.2-6.0.7_openssl_pkcs7_info_init.patch
+---
+ src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_pkcs7.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_pkcs7.c b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_pkcs7.c
+index d9abcf8..b15c8d7 100644
+--- a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_pkcs7.c
++++ b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_pkcs7.c
+@@ -222,8 +222,8 @@ static auth_cfg_t *verify_signature(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+ 	auth_cfg_t *auth, *found = NULL;
+ 	identification_t *issuer, *serial;
+ 	chunk_t attrs = chunk_empty, sig, attr;
+-	X509_NAME *name;
+-	ASN1_INTEGER *snr;
++	X509_NAME *name = NULL;
++	ASN1_INTEGER *snr = NULL;
+ 	int i;
+
+ 	if (CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id(si, NULL, &name, &snr) != 1)
+@@ -628,8 +628,8 @@ static bool decrypt(private_openssl_pkcs7_t *this,
+ 			identification_t *serial, *issuer;
+ 			private_key_t *private;
+ 			X509_ALGOR *alg;
+-			X509_NAME *name;
+-			ASN1_INTEGER *sn;
++			X509_NAME *name = NULL;
++			ASN1_INTEGER *sn = NULL;
+ 			u_char zero = 0;
+ 			int oid;
+
+-- 
+2.45.4
+

SPECS/strongswan/CVE-2026-78124.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 142daf52f46889f2eb22df97507a6015a6ea3264 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
+Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 16:02:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] openssl: Fix memory leaks after enumerating certificates in
+ PKCS#7 container
+
+This can be triggered via IKEv1.
+
+Fixes: 04884be3b5f7 ("Implement openssl PKCS#7 certficiate enumeration")
+Fixes: CVE-2026-78124
+Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account <azurelinux-security@microsoft.com>
+Upstream-reference: https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2026-78124/strongswan-5.0.2-6.0.7_openssl_pkcs7_certs_leak.patch
+---
+ src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_pkcs7.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_pkcs7.c b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_pkcs7.c
+index b15c8d7..cefe1ae 100644
+--- a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_pkcs7.c
++++ b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_pkcs7.c
+@@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ typedef struct {
+ METHOD(enumerator_t, cert_destroy, void,
+ 	cert_enumerator_t *this)
+ {
++	if (this->certs)
++	{
++		sk_X509_pop_free(this->certs, X509_free);
++	}
+ 	DESTROY_IF(this->cert);
+ 	free(this);
+ }
+-- 
+2.45.4
+

SPECS/strongswan/CVE-2026-78126.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From a07e438a41df27bfe7a94bb11881d83a160e30b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
+Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 10:00:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] eap-aka: Only accept AKA-Synchronization-Failure if expected
+
+This fixes a NULL-pointer dereference if the client sends such an error
+before the server issued a challenge and allocated this->rand.
+
+Fixes: 26e246769224 ("ported EAP-AKA branch into trunk")
+Fixes: 4735965fc048 ("EAP servers check if the received EAP message was expected")
+Fixes: CVE-2026-78126
+Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account <azurelinux-security@microsoft.com>
+Upstream-reference: https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2026-78126/strongswan-4.4.0-6.0.7_eap_aka_sync_fail.patch
+---
+ src/libcharon/plugins/eap_aka/eap_aka_server.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_aka/eap_aka_server.c b/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_aka/eap_aka_server.c
+index 0712ccc..95d4b03 100644
+--- a/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_aka/eap_aka_server.c
++++ b/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_aka/eap_aka_server.c
+@@ -505,6 +505,12 @@ static status_t process_synchronize(private_eap_aka_server_t *this,
+ 	simaka_attribute_t type;
+ 	chunk_t data, auts = chunk_empty;
+
++	if (this->pending != AKA_CHALLENGE)
++	{
++		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received %N, but not expected",
++			 simaka_subtype_names, AKA_SYNCHRONIZATION_FAILURE);
++		return FAILED;
++	}
+ 	if (this->synchronized)
+ 	{
+ 		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received %N, but peer did already resynchronize",
+-- 
+2.45.4
+

SPECS/strongswan/CVE-2026-78127.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+From b002b7ca810edc05d8fe910ed270ad945943759b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
+Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 09:19:42 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] message: Avoid memory leak if string buffer for message is
+ too small
+
+This leaked 40 or 80 bytes per parsed message for the enumerators that
+were not destroyed.  While triggering an OOM condition will require quite
+a lot of messages and the DoS protection also helps avoiding that this
+is triggered quickly, it all depends on the memory constraints of the
+system and the time available to the attacker.  Also, if IKEv1 is allowed,
+it could get quicker as the lack of message IDs doesn't allow dismissing
+unexpected messages before parsing them.
+
+Fixes: 092958c89d52 ("fixed payload debug message")
+Fixes: 6a4a47511f75 ("Show contents of the CP payload in message_t stringification")
+Fixes: CVE-2026-78127
+Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account <azurelinux-security@microsoft.com>
+Upstream-reference: https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2026-78127/strongswan-5.3.1-6.0.7_message_log_leak.patch
+---
+ src/libcharon/encoding/message.c | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/libcharon/encoding/message.c b/src/libcharon/encoding/message.c
+index 1686bae..7af13a4 100644
+--- a/src/libcharon/encoding/message.c
++++ b/src/libcharon/encoding/message.c
+@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ static char* get_string(private_message_t *this, char *buf, int len)
+ 						   payload->get_type(payload));
+ 		if (written >= len || written < 0)
+ 		{
+-			return buf;
++			goto err;
+ 		}
+ 		pos += written;
+ 		len -= written;
+@@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@ static char* get_string(private_message_t *this, char *buf, int len)
+ 			}
+ 			if (written >= len || written < 0)
+ 			{
+-				return buf;
++				goto err;
+ 			}
+ 			pos += written;
+ 			len -= written;
+@@ -1358,7 +1358,7 @@ static char* get_string(private_message_t *this, char *buf, int len)
+ 							   eap->get_code(eap), method);
+ 			if (written >= len || written < 0)
+ 			{
+-				return buf;
++				goto err;
+ 			}
+ 			pos += written;
+ 			len -= written;
+@@ -1399,7 +1399,8 @@ static char* get_string(private_message_t *this, char *buf, int len)
+ 								   attribute->get_type(attribute));
+ 				if (written >= len || written < 0)
+ 				{
+-					return buf;
++					attributes->destroy(attributes);
++					goto err;
+ 				}
+ 				pos += written;
+ 				len -= written;
+@@ -1411,7 +1412,7 @@ static char* get_string(private_message_t *this, char *buf, int len)
+ 				written = snprintf(pos, len, ")");
+ 				if (written >= len || written < 0)
+ 				{
+-					return buf;
++					goto err;
+ 				}
+ 				pos += written;
+ 				len -= written;
+@@ -1433,7 +1434,7 @@ static char* get_string(private_message_t *this, char *buf, int len)
+ 			}
+ 			if (written >= len || written < 0)
+ 			{
+-				return buf;
++				goto err;
+ 			}
+ 			pos += written;
+ 			len -= written;
+@@ -1448,7 +1449,7 @@ static char* get_string(private_message_t *this, char *buf, int len)
+ 							   frag->get_total_fragments(frag));
+ 			if (written >= len || written < 0)
+ 			{
+-				return buf;
++				goto err;
+ 			}
+ 			pos += written;
+ 			len -= written;
+@@ -1461,16 +1462,16 @@ static char* get_string(private_message_t *this, char *buf, int len)
+ 			written = snprintf(pos, len, "(%d)", unknown->get_type(unknown));
+ 			if (written >= len || written < 0)
+ 			{
+-				return buf;
++				goto err;
+ 			}
+ 			pos += written;
+ 			len -= written;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
+-
+-	/* remove last space */
+ 	snprintf(pos, len, " ]");
++
++err:
++	enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
+ 	return buf;
+ }
+ #endif
+-- 
+2.45.4
+

SPECS/strongswan/CVE-2026-78129.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+From 5a9a43c975187df6ca24ecb58c3af9bdae59f542 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
+Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 11:55:31 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] pkcs5: Validate parsed parameters to avoid DoS attacks
+
+With the unbounded iterations, an attacker can craft a PKCS#7 file and
+send it during IKEv1 to block the processing thread practically for an
+unlimited amount of time.
+
+As the key length is used for an allocation on the stack, not limiting
+it could cause a crash.  We validate it after parsing the params, but
+since `encryption_algorithm_from_oid()` only returns trusted key lengths
+that are lower than the limit, that's fine.
+
+The unlimited salt length had no direct impact (the maximum is bound by
+the accepted message size), but we now limit it as well before cloning.
+
+Fixes: 4076e3ee9121 ("Extract PKCS#5 handling from pkcs8 plugin to separate helper class")
+Fixes: fd1ff46f6143 ("Added support for PKCS#5 v2 schemes when decrypting PKCS#8 files.")
+Fixes: cab127cba66c ("Added support for encrypted PKCS#8 files (for some PKCS#5 v1.5 schemes).")
+Fixes: CVE-2026-78129
+Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account <azurelinux-security@microsoft.com>
+Upstream-reference: https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2026-78129/strongswan-5.1.0-6.0.7_pkcs5_params_dos.patch
+---
+ src/libstrongswan/crypto/pkcs5.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/crypto/pkcs5.c b/src/libstrongswan/crypto/pkcs5.c
+index e48a9ad..306c652 100644
+--- a/src/libstrongswan/crypto/pkcs5.c
++++ b/src/libstrongswan/crypto/pkcs5.c
+@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
+  * for more details.
+  */
+
++#include <inttypes.h>
++
+ #include "pkcs5.h"
+
+ #include <utils/debug.h>
+@@ -22,6 +24,15 @@
+ #include <asn1/asn1_parser.h>
+ #include <credentials/containers/pkcs12.h>
+
++/** maximum accepted length for salts in parsed parameters */
++#define PKCS5_SALT_LEN_MAX			128
++
++/** maximum accepted iteration count in parsed parameters */
++#define PKCS5_ITERATIONS_MAX		1000000
++
++/** maximum key length accepted in parsed parameters */
++#define PKCS5_KEY_LEN_MAX			64
++
+ typedef struct private_pkcs5_t private_pkcs5_t;
+
+ /**
+@@ -374,6 +385,41 @@ METHOD(pkcs5_t, decrypt, bool,
+ 						   keymat, key, iv);
+ }
+
++/**
++ * Make sure the salt has an appropriate length
++ */
++static bool validate_salt_length(chunk_t salt)
++{
++	if (salt.len > PKCS5_SALT_LEN_MAX)
++	{
++		DBG1(DBG_ASN, "  salt length %zu exceeds maximum of %zu bytes",
++			 salt.len, (size_t)PKCS5_SALT_LEN_MAX);
++		return FALSE;
++	}
++	return TRUE;
++}
++
++/**
++ * Validate that parsed parameters are in an allowed range
++ */
++static bool validate_params(private_pkcs5_t *this)
++{
++	if (!this->iterations || this->iterations > PKCS5_ITERATIONS_MAX)
++	{
++		DBG1(DBG_ASN, "  iteration count %" PRIu64 " is out of range "
++			 "(1-%" PRIu64 ")", this->iterations,
++			 (uint64_t)PKCS5_ITERATIONS_MAX);
++		return FALSE;
++	}
++	if (this->keylen > PKCS5_KEY_LEN_MAX)
++	{
++		DBG1(DBG_ASN, "  key length %zu exceeds maximum of %zu bytes",
++			 this->keylen, (size_t)PKCS5_KEY_LEN_MAX);
++		return FALSE;
++	}
++	return TRUE;
++}
++
+ /**
+  * ASN.1 definition of a PBEParameter structure
+  */
+@@ -394,7 +440,7 @@ static bool parse_pbes1_params(private_pkcs5_t *this, chunk_t blob, int level0)
+ 	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+ 	chunk_t object;
+ 	int objectID;
+-	bool success;
++	bool success = FALSE;
+
+ 	parser = asn1_parser_create(pbeParameterObjects, blob);
+ 	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
+@@ -405,6 +451,10 @@ static bool parse_pbes1_params(private_pkcs5_t *this, chunk_t blob, int level0)
+ 		{
+ 			case PBEPARAM_SALT:
+ 			{
++				if (!validate_salt_length(object))
++				{
++					goto end;
++				}
+ 				this->salt = chunk_clone(object);
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+@@ -416,6 +466,11 @@ static bool parse_pbes1_params(private_pkcs5_t *this, chunk_t blob, int level0)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	success = parser->success(parser);
++	if (success)
++	{
++		success = validate_params(this);
++	}
++end:
+ 	parser->destroy(parser);
+ 	return success;
+ }
+@@ -466,6 +521,10 @@ static bool parse_pbkdf2_params(private_pkcs5_t *this, chunk_t blob, int level0)
+ 		{
+ 			case PBKDF2_SALT:
+ 			{
++				if (!validate_salt_length(object))
++				{
++					goto end;
++				}
+ 				this->salt = chunk_clone(object);
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+@@ -495,6 +554,10 @@ static bool parse_pbkdf2_params(private_pkcs5_t *this, chunk_t blob, int level0)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	success = parser->success(parser);
++	if (success)
++	{
++		success = validate_params(this);
++	}
+ end:
+ 	parser->destroy(parser);
+ 	return success;
+-- 
+2.45.4
+